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WHAT IS A COMMUNITY? 





For several years now, it has become commonplace for sociological and political 
analyses of Israel to highlight communalism. Sociologists have drawn attention to “the 
perennial nature of Jewish ethnicity
1
”, whereas political scientists have stressed “the 
fragmentation of Israeli society into communities
2
.” This feature has been interpreted 
by many observers as the swan song for a certain form of Zionist ideology that 
dominated the construction of the State and the first decades of its existence. At the 
present time, the need for unity of the Jewish people is no longer dependent on 
homogeneity, or on the denigration of Jews from the Middle East, Russia or Ethiopia. 
In the past the Sephardis were forced to westernize, and to abandon customs viewed as 
overly similar to the Arab enemy. Today, some Sephardic Jews, in particular through 
the Shas political party, have used their cultural difference with the Ashkenazi 
establishment (still largely at the helm) as a tool to penetrate the political arena. 
Although the Jews who arrived recently from Ethiopia have yet to form a political 
party, Jews from the former USSR have their own ethnic political representation, in 
addition to a whole network of various community institutions – associations, 
newspapers, television channels, etc. – which structure their daily lives.  
In short, and even though Sammy Smooha stresses the absence of an Israeli 
multicultural ethos,
3
 everything points to the fact that Israel is in the process of joining 
– with ups and downs - the set of countries who have opted for the community mode as 
a means of dealing with tensions between ethnic groups at various levels of 
mobilization. Thus Israeli society is not only simply a plural society in the sense of a 
social unit in which several groups coexist, which, while integrated within the culture 
also maintain dividing lines which separate them from the rest of society. Rather it is a 
pluralistic society where the groups in question have become political actors and are 
represented in the official political system. A number of writers have pointed out that 
this transition from the societal to the political has been facilitated in Israel by the 
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 ibid. 
electoral system and the tradition of a government by consensus. In fact the electoral 
system with its single district and proportional representation, party list system and a 
low qualifying threshold to obtain a seat in parliament implies that the elected officials 
represent communities or factions to whom they are expected to funnel a maximum 
amount of public funds
4
. Secondly, a consensual government
5
, made up of a broad 
coalition aimed ideally at representing and accommodating the entire political spectrum 
and hence representing the society as a whole, encourages a duplication of the society 
in the political system. In other words, in Israel, it would seem that societal pluralism is 
mirrored by carbon-copy political pluralism. 
After a long period of invisibility
6
, Arab citizens as a community today constitute an 
integral part of this sociopolitical system where social integration is achieved through 
segmentation. On the individual level, Arab integration in the political community 
system is reflected in an over-communication
7
 of Palestinian identity. Until the mid 
80s, the historical tie between Israeli Arab citizens and Palestinians dispersed in other 
territories – the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Diaspora, etc. – was taboo. Those who 
mentioned it publicly were considered to be extreme nationalists, both by the Arab 
population itself, anxious to maintain the modus vivendi with the Jewish State, as by the 
Jewish population and the various Israeli authorities. The fore-fronting of the 
Palestinian identity was only found in nationalistic circles represented by the 
Communist Party of Israel, at that time the proponent of a state openly opposed to 
Israel, which de facto served as the sole Arab nationalist party, or purely and simply in 
outlawed groups. To be part of the overall social system, and in particular the economic 
sphere, Arab elites adopted the classic strategies of stigmatized minorities. They 
concealed their identities, adapted to their minority situation by restricting their 
distinctive features to areas of activity involving no interaction with the majority, and 
finally played the ethnic card by developing their activities in key areas of their 
community
8
. Today, in contrast, many Arabs no longer hesitate to publicly proclaim 
their Palestinian identity. Although in private, and across all generations, they stress 
their ties to the Palestinian people by recalling the Nakba
9
 and mention family members 
in refugee camps in Lebanon or in Syria, the political elite has now penetrated the 
political space as Palestinians, proclaiming their membership and solidarity with the 
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Palestinian people even in the Knesset. Arab students wave Palestinian flags in Israeli 
universities and challenge their Jewish colleagues on the de facto bi-national nature of 
the State. Moreover, and the feature is also a recent one, some of their Jewish fellow 
countrymen have not remained silent as regards this celebration of Palestinian identity: 
it has become increasingly commonplace to encounter individuals – at least on the Left 
– who use the term “Palestinian” to define their Arab fellow citizens, thus 
acknowledging their attempts at self-definition. 
The over-communication of Palestinian identity in Arab citizens may seem 
surprising, since the Israeli context is a-priori so hostile to this type of affirmation. It is 
even more surprising given that in other sociopolitical contexts in the region, there is 
under-communication of Palestinian identity. In Lebanon for example, young 
Palestinians try to leave the [refugee] camps by claiming to be Sunnites, trying to link 
themselves to the Sunnite community which appears to them to be the only vector to 
participation in Lebanese society. What this comes down to is that the Israeli space, at 
this point in its history, is not hostile to an affirmation of Palestinian identity. On the 
contrary, it encourages it. This is because an identity is never a product of its own 
sources: it is built up from its dialogue with the environment. Many writers have 
pointed out that in the case that interests us here, the prime structuring interaction was 
the one with the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, starting in 1967. The 
occupation of these territories by Tzahal,
10
 by opening the Green Line
11
, ended the 
isolation of the Arab citizens of Israel, and enabled them to renew ties with their fellow 
countrymen. These ties formed the seed bed in which Palestinity gradually developed, 
up to the current massive dissemination of the idea that the people who are generally 
known as Israeli Arabs are an integral part of the Palestinian people. 
 
Although the opening of Green Line in 1967 was indeed decisive in particular for 
the structuring of the Islamic Movement
12
, the decisive factor in my opinion was the 
communal feature of Israeli society, which more than anchoring of Palestinian identity 
in Arab citizens, lifted the taboo. In other words, the Palestinian identity of the Arab 
citizens of Israel is less the outcome of a progressive mobilization of the Arab 
population than the result of Israeli institutional changes which created a place in which 
they could express themselves. The crucial interaction was thus less with the 
Palestinians than with certain Israeli actors. The history of the development of the Arab 
parties shows that it corresponds to the period of national unity governments – between 
1984 and 1988. This was a time when the dove faction of the Labor party, which 
clearly emerged from 1982 onwards, gave its party the identity of the “peace camp.” It 
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also began to adopt a strategy of co-opting Arab nationalistic organizations to obtain 
maximum support to defeat the Likud, with whom it was neck and neck
13
. In general, 
this period can be characterized by the emergence of “fringe political groups,”
14
 in 
particular another key communal actor, Shas, which moved from its marginal position 
to a source of support for one side or the other which was trying to extricate itself from 
a classic political stalemate. Although the cohesion of Arab citizens into a community 
is undeniably the equivalent of a protest movement against the Israeli State and its 
representatives, it also results from a complex process, part of which involved full 
participation of the Jewish political establishment
15
. 
However the case of the formation of Arab citizens into a community and a political 
actor prompts a reassessment of the doxa which states that in Israel, the communal 
political system is a direct reflection of societal pluralism and is based on it. Aside from 
the case of Shas’ famous social networks which were created after its rise to power and 
which are fueled by public funds, the process of patronage of the Arab political parties 
by part of the leftist Jewish establishment shows that political logic dominates. In 
Israel, it is first of all the political system which is communal, and this structural feature 
impacts after the fact on social organization, indeed pushing it towards an extreme 
politicization of the entire social space. Certain groups reached the qualifying threshold 
for political representation solely because the government was in crisis, and only then 
dipped into funding to expand. These groups were initially aggregates of individuals 
who objectively shared common features but in too nebulous a way to form the basis 
for political action. Political representation became a means of objectifying the 
common features, and transforming them into the outward symbols of membership and 
a political slogan. As Bourdieu
16
 stressed, a group is not formed solely on the basis of a 
common mode of existence, but rather onits knowledge of it. Secondly, the group 
spokesman plays a key role in this process of group emergence and self-recognition. By 
re-presenting and symbolizing it, the spokesman enables the group to coalesce and 
takes part in its formation. 
Once the Arab community had achieved this recognition/awareness through 
political representation however, it was also subjected to centrifugal forces which 
threatened it with implosion. Aside from purely political struggles which for example 
pitted Azmi Bishara against his former allies of the Democratic Front for Peace and 
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Equality (Hadash) during the 1999 campaign, the continued hamula
17
 rivalry at the 
local level, and the religious tension between Christians and Muslims in Nazareth have 
been interpreted for the last two years as the symptom of the failure of the Arab 
community to maintain its newly acquired cohesiveness. The idea of fragmentation is 
not only a classic one in the scientific analysis of the Arab community in Israel but also 
a pervasive theme among the players themselves. In other words, aside from the 
observation of an unprecedented dynamic of unification, which constitutes the 
emergence of an Arab community, there is a consensus to emphasize its limitations: the 
Arab community, unable for example to agree on a single list for the national elections, 
remains an unfinished process. 
How can these two opposing thrusts of unification and fragmentation, clearly both 
at work within the Arab population of Israel, be reconciled? First, the concept of unity 
should be discarded since in most cases it refers to a greater extent to an ideological 
stance than a descriptive concept. In this sense, and in this particular case, the concept 
of community should be divested of the sociological analyses of Ferdinand Tönnies or 
Sir Henry Maine who, by positing a dualism between community and society helped 
give the community an image of a unitary, melded group, with no room for internal 
differences. However, when the community is formed primarily through political 
representation, the struggles for power for the leadership monopoly are inevitable and 
should be interpreted as signs of the construction process rather than failure. Secondly, 
after eliminating melding as building block of the community, the apparent 
contradiction between unification and fragmentation can be resolved by introducing the 
notion of a looser bond. Here, the community tie is “a sharing that somehow binds,
18
” 
“a social tie structure […] in the final analysis fairly loose,”
19
 based not on the 
elimination of factions but rather on shared representations produced and maintained by 
a network of institutions. The role of community institutions is fundamental, but it 
consists less of a totalitarian binding of individuals than generating a consensus
20
 on 
group identity and its aims. By beginning with the actors rather than the objective 
structures of the group, an equivalency can be established, as Giovanni Sartori 
suggested, between community and consensus.
21
 This suggests that a community exists 
first and foremost through its shared symbols which make unity possible above and 
beyond divergences. As anthropologists have shown, a symbol is a multifaceted 
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representation, which differentiates it from the univocal sign, in that it can be 
interpreted in many ways depending on the actor who uses it. A symbol can thus be 
shared by a large number of people who will each assign it a different meaning. To 
preserve the communal bond, what is crucial is a sharing of the form and not the 
meaning
22
. This leads to abandoning the notion of the symbol as a form of expression 
and viewing it as a performative. In other words, a symbol not only expresses a pre-
existing reality, but is part of its formation process
23
. 
To return to the concrete example of the Israeli Arab community, it is obvious that 
the consensus and the symbols are present and fulfill their role completely. Palestinian 
identity, which according to a recent survey, 80 % of the Arab population claims as its 
own, is the omnipresent symbol that unifies all social and political factions. The Arab 
parties, who are the main community institutions, fulfill their role as consensus-
producers completely. On the one hand their slogans are adopted across the board, even 
by individuals who claim to be a-political. Secondly, despite fierce electoral infighting, 
and beyond a few specific proposals which are the basis for their political identity and 
differentiate them from their opponents, they all basically defend the same platform. 
This is centered on backing the struggle of the Palestinian people for an independent 
state with Jerusalem as its capital, and hint at support for a binational Jewish-Arab state 
inside the Green Line
24
. This sharing of symbols results in astonishing cooperation 
between Arab parties in the Knesset where they in fact form a single bloc. 
The Islamic Movement, accused of promoting religious solidarity to the detriment 
of national unity, is no exception. On the basis of the idea that the emergence of a 
community of the Arab citizens results from political representation and the electoral 
strategies of the Labor party, it might be assumed that other Jewish political actors 
would be interested in splitting the Arab vote. Currently, the Labor Party receives about 
95 % of the Arab vote in elections for prime minister. The Likud Party thus has very 
little maneuvering room to attract Arab backing. Aware of this situation, certain Likud 
strategists thought they could negotiate a number of Muslim votes in the 1999 national 
elections in exchange for financial support to the Islamic Movement in its rivalry with 
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Hadash in Nazareth. The attempt failed, first because the stigma attached to the Likud 
in the Arab population is too potent for a political organization to authorize itself to be 
allied to it officially. In the Arab view, the right does not exist in Israel, there is only the 
racist extreme right. Secondly, the Likud leadership preferred to continue 
delegitimizing the Labor party by arguing that it does not have a Jewish majority and 
thus does not represent the real Israel. Thus, a Muslim community, until only recently 
weakly institutionalized as compared to other religious communities like the Druse and 
Christians, appears to be unable to develop along the same modes as the Arab 
community; i.e., through the patronage of a large Jewish party. The coalescing of 
Muslims into a separate community, i.e. into a group based not only on sharing of 
common objective features but also as an actor and able to carry out a collective 
mission adheres less to a political dynamic based on representation than on a micro-
social one. In contrast to Shas which only emerged as a social welfare actor after its rise 
to power and its use of public funding, the Islamic Movement first of all wove social 
networks and then turned itself into a political party. Little by little it built up a new 
religious leadership of the young and educated, which gradually replaced the old 
generation of imams, who were considered to be incompetent and had little impact 
because they had no training, given the lack of charia institutions in Israel until 
recently. The Islamic Movement can by no means be subsumed under the banner of an 
Islamist Political Party. Although the ideology of the Moslem Brotherhood is received 
well, it is primarily in its neo-fundamentalist
25
 version, which having renounced the 
overthrow of power and an Islamic state, above all emphasizes conduct and piety. 
Similarly, it reaches out to a mixed audience ranging from young people, educated in 
Israeli universities, attracted by a political ideology that still garners much support in 
the region. This ranges from the pious elder happy to have finally found a well trained 
imam in his neighborhood mosque, to the petty bourgeois concerned with the defense 
of Muslim “ethnic honor”
26
 versus the prosperous and well-organized Christian 
community. 
An understanding of the relationships between these two processes of Arab and 
Muslim community building traversing the Israeli Arab population is thus a major 
challenge. At this stage, is it clear that the Islamic Movement, the main vector for 
Muslim community shaping, integrates fully into the consensus on Palestinian identity, 
and is less concerned about defending a multi-religious state than a bi-national one. It 
may be the case that the strengthening of the Arab community has paradoxically 
encouraged Arab citizens to bring other aspects of their identity into the limelight. 
Among the followers of the Islamic Movement, the feeling of belonging to the 
Palestinian people prompts them to introspect on other possible identities -- Muslim, 
Arab, human -- which they attempt to hierarchize. By becoming consensual, the 
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Palestinian identity has led to a dynamic of differentiation: individuals, attempting to 
differentiate themselves from others, turn to sub-identities. The emergence of a Muslim 
community could thus be the paradoxical outcome of the anchoring of the Arab 
community, with consensus producing the Other rather than the Same. 
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